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STATE LOYALTY PROGRAMS AND THE SUPREME COURT
Since World War II, issues of loyalty and subversion have con-
fronted the Supreme Court more than at any other time. This
fact reflects a national preoccupation with loyalty which arose at the end
of the war. The sudden realization of physical vulnerability coupled with
the novel and complex character of the cold war engendered an atmosphere
of fear and a feeling that existing laws were inadequate to protect the
security of the government.' Communist infiltration and propaganda
techniques have intensifed this apprehension.' As a result, broad loyalty
programs affecting individual freedoms have been enacted and rigorously
enforced.
Many state loyalty statutes prescribe loyalty qualifications for public
employment. Generally, these statutes fall into four categories: those
which require a loyalty oath as a condition of employment and result in
discharge for its violation; those which likewise require an oath and also
provide perjury sanctions for its violation; those which do not require
an oath, but proscribe certain disloyal conduct and result in discharge for
violation of the provisions; and those which require the employee to
answer questions pertaining to loyalty when asked by proper authorities
and which result in discharge for refusal to answer. For convenience,
the respective categories of statutes will be referred to as oaths resulting
in discharge, oaths subject to perjury, proscriptive statutes, and refusal-
to-answer statutes. Thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico have some type of oath; twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia have proscriptive statutes; and four states and the District of
Columbia have refusal-to-answer statutes.3
1. See Cramton, The Supreme Coirt and State Power to Deal with Subversion
and Loyalty, 43 MINN. L. Rxv. 1025 (1959).
2. See O'Brian, New Encroachmets on Individual Freedom, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1952).
3. See J. Bryson, LEGALITY OF LOYALTY OATH AND NoN-OATH REQUIREMENTS
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS (1963), for a detailed compilation of all state loyalty
statutes. Indiana has two types of statutes: an oath resulting in discharge which applies
to teachers in the public school system:
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution
and the laws of the United States and . . . Indiana, and will, by precept and
example, promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States
and of . . . Indiana, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance
to the government....
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-5112 (Burns 1933); and a proscriptive statute which applies to
public officers and employees. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5207 (Burns 1956 Repl.). The
latter bars from office or employment anyone who is
(A) . . . a member of the Communist party or of any ... organization which
advocates in any manner the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the . . .
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Three major issues are raised by these statutes. First, is the state's
interest in the loyalty of employees sufficient to justify the restriction
of first amendment freedoms and, if so, to what extent may they be
restricted ?' Second, when an employee has been asked by proper authori-
ties to answer a question, can he be discharged if he invokes the fifth
amendment? Third, may an individual who refuses to take an oath for
conscientious reasons be denied public employment without a hearing at
which he may prove his loyalty by explaining his conscientious refusal
and thereby qualify for employment?
OATHS AND PROSCRIPTIVE STATUTES
The power of the state to condition public employment on subscrip-
tion to a loyalty oath has never been questioned. The purpose of this
legislation has been recognized to be the protection of the government
against subversion and the preservation of the integrity of public education
by establishing loyalty as a qualification for employment.' The use of an
oath has been held to be a reasonable means to effectuate this purpose, and
an individual who refuses to take an oath may consequently be excluded
from public employment.' Membership in organizations, as well as an
individual's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness
and loyalty.'
However, the state's power is not without limitation; due process
prohibits an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power. In early cases,
the Supreme Court held that loyalty oaths could not be enforced against
an individual unless the statute required scienter; the Court, however,
readily dismissed this objection by simply reading a requirement of
scienter into the statutes.8 A statute9 declaring that membership in an
government . .. by revolution, force, violence, sedition, or which engages in
any un-American activities;
or who is found
(B) . . . by word of mouth or writing to advocate, advise or teach the duty,
necessity, or propriety of overthrowing . . . the government . . . by force or
violence; or [to] print, publish, edit, issue or knowingly circulate, sell, distribute
or publicly display any . . . written . . . matter in any form for the purpose
of advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that the government . . . shall
be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means.
INDiy. ANN. STAT. § 10-5204 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
4. Professors and teachers have brought the majority of cases involving this
issue in the name of academic freedom.
5. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720-21 (1951).
6. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951). For discussion of the problem raised by those who refuse to take
an oath for conscientious reasons, see text accompanying notes 109-24 infra.
7. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
8. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
9. N.Y. EDc. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1953).
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organization listed as subversive "shall constitute prima facie evidence
for disqualification" was recognized as consitutional because the pre-
sumption was not conclusive, but allowed an individual to prove his
loyalty in a hearing. 0 However, a statute which expressly provides that
the fact of membership alone disqualifies is unconstitutional because it
fails to distinguish between innocent and knowing membership." A
person may join an organization and yet be unaware of its illegal activities
and goals, or an organization engaged only in legitimate activities at the
time of the individual's affiliation may subsequently adopt illegal purposes.
A statute which includes innocent with knowing membership raises a
conclusive presumption of disloyalty from mere membership and it thus
violates due process as an indiscriminate and arbitrary exercise of
power. 2 Also, in Shelton v. Tucker, 3 the Court held that a state cannot
require, as a condition of employment for a teacher, an annual affidavit
listing without limitation every organization to which he has belonged or
contributed within the preceding five years. The statute was objectionable
because many relations which could not have any relevancy to the teacher's
fitness would fall within its scope. The state's interest "cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved."' 4
Recent cases have raised the issue of vague language in loyalty oath
statutes. In Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, an oath was found to
be lacking in "terms susceptible of objective measurement" and to embrace
certain "guiltless knowing behavior."' Again, in Baggett v. Bullitt, the
statutory language was found to be applicable to an undefined class of
"guiltless knowing behavior"' 6 and to lack "an ascertainable standard
10. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). However, this statute was
recently held unconstitutional because of pertinent doctrine which developed after this
case had been decided. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
11. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
12. Id. at 190-91.
13. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
14. Id. at 488.
15. 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961). The pertinent language of the oath was "I . . .
solemnly swear or affirm . .. that I have not and will not lend my aid, support, advice,
counsel or influence to the Communist Party... ." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1965).
16. 377 U.S. 360, 368 (1964). The following oath applied only to teachers:
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and
laws of the United States . . . and .. . Washington, and will by precept and
example promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States
... and ... Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance
to the government....
VAsH. LAWS ch. 103 (1931). The oath requirements of a 1955 act, WASH. LAWS ch.
377 (1955), applicable to all state employees, incorporated provisions of the Washington
Subversive Activities Act of 1951 which provided that no subversive person was
eligible for public employment. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.81.060 (1961). "Sub-
versive person" was defined as:
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of conduct."" While these concepts are not very clear in themselves, the
point which the Court makes is obvious. The Court could not say in
either case that the oath imposed proper restrictions which the state could
justifiably require. Although the state courts had construed scienter into
the oaths, the language still failed to indicate clearly the extent to which
an employee must know of illegal activities or purposes of an organization
in order to be considered a subversive member; it also failed to define
specifically what conduct was actually proscribed. While Baggett noted
that the reasoning of prior cases'8 involving the Smith Act was not
any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or
advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit . . .
any act intended to overthrow, destory or alter, or to assist in the overthrow,
destruction or alteration of . . . the government . . . by revolution, force, or
violence...
VASH. REv. CoDaE ANN. § 9.81.010(5) (1961).
17. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). The 1931 oath in this case, note
16 supra, is nearly identical to Indiana's oath, note 3 supra. The defense argued that
the oath is based on a promise of future conduct, and thus a conviction of perjury could
not be sustained for its breach. The Court, however, rejected this argument becaues it
failed to account for the conscientious and those who believe that the law means what
it says, and also "the possibility of prosecution cannot be gainsaid." Id. at 374. The
Indiana statute does not provide for perjury sanctions; but, the Court has indicated that
it does not intend to impose different standards of clarity for oaths subject to perjury
and oaths resulting in discharge. The Indiana oath, then, appears to be unconstitutionally
vague.
The Court also objected to the use of the term "revolution" in the 1955 oath, note
16 supra. The ordinary meaning of that term includes any rapid or fundamental change,
and thus extends to peaceful alteration. In order to meet constitutional requirements, the
scope of the statute must be expressly restricted to overthrow by force or violence. Id.
at 370. Indiana's proscriptive statute, note 3 supra, includes "revolution," and consequently
it is subject to the same objection. Furthermore, the Court would probably object to the
phrase "any un-American activities" which also appears in Indiana's proscriptive statute.
The broad phrase is not defined and it falls within that class of words which fails to
be "terms susceptible of objective measurement."
18. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). In connection with Cramp and Baggett, the relevant language of the
Act is as follows:
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the
government... by force or violence... ; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such
government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or
publicly displays any written . . . matter advocating, advising, or teaching the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing any government . . .
by force or violence, or attempts to do so;...
Shall be fined... or imprisoned....
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
In these cases, the Court has interpreted this language to embrace either an
advocacy to immediately overthrow the government by force or violence or a present
advocacy of future action for the overthrow of the government by force or violence. The
teaching or advocacy of abstract theory without the required intent and other factors
cannot by themselves constitute a violation of the Act. The teaching and advocacy of
violent overthrow must appear to be reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite
individuals to such action as speedily as circumstances would permit. Since the Smith
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controlling in cases involving state legislation because the Court generally
does not construe necessary implications into state statutes,' the require-
ments which are established in those cases are clearly reflected in both
Cramp and Baggett. So, in Cramp, the Court objected that the oath
"says nothing of advocacy of violent overthrow of the state or federal
government . . . [or] . . . of membership or affiliation with the Com-
munist Party."2 In Baggett, the Court concerned itself with the objection
that the oaths were not limited to advocacy directed toward the promotion
of unlawful action. The range of activities which could reasonably fall
within the scope of the statutory language was held to be far too wide;2'
a statute which is "so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
due process of law."22
In Elfbrandt v. Russell, ' the Court was confronted with the issue
of nominal and passive membership. The Arizona Supreme Court had
construed the wording of an oath 4 to include virtually all knowing
membership.2" When the case was remanded for consideration in light
of Baggett v. Bullitt, the majority of the Arizona court sustained the
oath without discussing the membership clause.2" Upon appeal, the
Supreme Court again referred to principles established in the Smith
Act cases, but in this opinion it relied upon them by citation and direct
quotation. Recognizing that "quasi-political" groups may have both legal
and illegal purposes and that knowing members may not actually support
the illegal purposes, the Court held the requirement of scienter by itself
Act is a federal statute, the Court can and must interpret as well as judge the Act;
thus, implications could be properly construed into the Act. This fact distinguishes the
manner in which the Court has treated state statutes.
19. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 (1964).
20. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 285 (1961).
21. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369-72 (1964).
22. Id. at 367; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
23. 384U.S. 11 (1966).
24. A gloss was added to the oath which subjected to a prosecution for perjury
and discharge from public employment anyone who subscribed to the oath and who
"knowingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member of the communist party . . . or
any other organization having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence
of the government of the state... [and who] prior to becoming or remaining a member
• . . had knowledge of said unlawful purpose. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-231
(1965 Supp.).
25. The language of the oath "prohibits any membership in any organization
having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force and violence of the government
of the State of Arizona or any of its political subdivisions including passive and nominal
membership .... There is no imputation that public officers and employees may hold or
retain memberships for exclusively lawful purposes." Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz.
1, 11, 381 P.2d 554, 560 (1963), rev'd, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
26. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 97 Ariz. 140, 397 P.2d 948 (1965).
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to be inadequate."7 The oath must be clearly restricted to "active"
membership with a "specific intent" to accomplish the illegal purpose.2"
In effect, the case adopts the standard established in Scales v. United
States20 and Noto v. United States."0 It serves as an example of the
rather hazy concept of "guiltless knowing behavior"; that is, when an
individual knows of an illegal purpose of an organization, such knowledge
without active participation or a specific intent to further that purpose
is "guiltless" and beyond the scope of the state's interest. Such members
do not present a substantial threat, either as citizens or as public employees,
to the security of the state.3' Since a violation of the oath concerning
membership required only scienter, the statute raised a conclusive pre-
sumption that a knowing member actively supported the illegal purposes
of the organization. This presumption directly conflicted with the recogni-
tion that a group may embrace both legal and illegal goals and that an
individual may join such groups provided he does not embrace the illegal
goals.'2 Thus, the case reaches a proper balance of interests and provides
a definite standard which can be easily understood and efficiently admin-
istered by the states. 3
27. While the decision of unconstitutionality is consistent with the Court's practice
of refusing to construe state statutes by reading the necessary implications into the
provisions, it is not exactly clear why the Court declared the entire statute invalid.
Apparently, the Court objected only to the membership clause, and it would seem that
the remainder of the statute could have been sustained.
28. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15 (1966).
29. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
30. 367 U.S. 290 (1961). The relevant language of the Smith Act for Elfbrandt
is as follows:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any . . . group ...
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow . . . of any ...
government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates
with, any such ... group ... knowing the purposes thereof-
Shall be fined.., or imprisoned ....
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
Scales and Noto held that the membership clause does not extend to all affiliations
with an organization which has an illegal purpose. The Court declined "to attribute to
Congress a purpose to punish nominal membership, even though accompanied by
'knowledge' and 'intent' .... It is more reasonable to believe that Congress contemplated
an objective standard fixed by the law itself, thereby assuring an even-handed application
of the statute." Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961). There must be clear
proof of active membership and a specific intent to further the illegal purposes of the
organization by resort to violence. These requisites "must be judged strictissimi jwris,
for otherwise there is danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an
organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence,
might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes,
because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share." Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
31. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966).
32. Id. at 15-17.
33. The objection that proof of "specific intent" and "active" membership imposes
an impossible or impractical burden upon the state is without merit. Similar burdens
permeate the law in many areas. This is not an unprecedented burden of proof, nor is
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Although Elfbrandt took a further step in limiting the impact of
loyalty oaths, the Court did not clearly indicate whether the standard
was to be imposed upon all oaths and proscriptive statutes;
this uncertainty also existed in the cases which introduced the concept of
guiltless knowing behavior. Elfbrandt, as well as Cramp and Baggett,
involved an oath subject to perjury. The earlier cases, 4 which simply
required scienter, involved oaths resulting in discharge. The dissent in
Elfbrandt felt that the majority was concerned solely with the consequence
of the perjury sanction and that the application of the opinion should
have been accordingly limited. 5
However, this question has been answered by Keyishian v. Board of
Regents." This case involved the complicated New York program which
at the time of the hearing did not require any disclaimer oath. The
Education Law37 and the Civil Service Law3" provided that "the utter-
ance of any treasonable or seditious word . . . or the doing of any
treasonable or seditious act" constituted cause for removal from public
employment. The Education Law did not define "treasonable or sediti-
ous," and while the Civil Service Law defined those terms as they were
defined in the Penal Law,39 the Court still held the meaning of "seditious"
to be too vague. The statutes did not present any clear distinction between
a "seditious" utterance and a mere statement of abstract doctrine, nor did
they indicate the extent to which the utterance "must be intended to and
tend to indoctrinate or incite to action in furtherance of the defined
it unjustifiable in view of the fundamental interests involved. If the statute is not
narrowly drawn to specifically define conduct "as constituting a clear and present danger
to a substantial interest of the State," it unnecessarily infringes upon the freedoms
protected by the first amendment. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1966). The
Court itself has remarked on this point:
The distinction between 'active' and 'nominal' membership is well under-
stood in common parlance . . ., and the point at which one shades into the
other is something that goes not to the sufficiency of the statute, but to the
adequacy of the trial court's guidance to the jury by way of instructions in a
particular case.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 223 (1961).
34. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
35. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 20-23 (1966).
36. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
37. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3021 (McKinney 1953).
38. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAWS § 105(1) (a) (McKinney 1959).
39. The term "seditious word or act" was equated with "criminal anarchy" as
defined in the Penal Code:
Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized government should be
overthrown by force or violence . . .or by any unlawful means. The advocacy
of such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony.
N.Y. PmT. LAW § 160 (McKinney 1944).
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doctrine."4 No individual who had read these statutes could possibly
have known how to distinguish between "seditious" and nonseditious
utterances and acts.
The Civil Service Law further provided that any person who "by
word of mouth or writing willfully and deliberately advocates, advises or
teaches the doctrine that the government . .. should be overthrown by
force, violence or any unlawful means" would be barred from public
employment.4' Since "advocacy" of the doctrine of forceful overthrow
was separately prohibited, the Court felt that this provision raised a
serious question as to whether the individual "teaching" or
"advising" this doctrine must advocate that doctrine himself in order to
fall within the scope of the act. The language of the provision could
reasonably extend to the mere advocacy of abstract doctrine." Similar
uncertainty was found in a section which excluded from employment
anyone who "prints, publishes, edits, issues or sells any . . . printed
matter in any form containing or advocating, advising or teaching the
doctrine" of forceful overthrow and who "advocates, advises, teaches, or
embraces the duty, necessity or propriety of adopting the doctrine con-
tained therein."'" Since there was no express requirement of specific
intent to effectuate the doctrine, this language also could reasonably
extend to the mere expression of belief.44 Furthermore, these provisions
were wholly lacking in "terms susceptible of objective measurement," and
the vagueness of the language was intensified by the complexity and
profusion of the entire program. Because the intricate network of statutes
did not "clearly inform teachers what is being sanctioned," the Court
held that this legislation plainly violated the principle that the government
may regulate first amendment rights only with narrow specificity.4"
Finally, the Court considered provisions of the Civil Service Law
and the Feinberg Law which made membership in "subversive" organiza-
tions prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment.46 Member-
40. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599 (1967). Indiana's proscriptive
statute, note 3 supra, includes but does not define "sedition." Consequently, the same
objections raised in respect to New York's statute could apply here.
41. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 105(1) (a) (McKinney 1959).
42. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1967).
43. N.Y. Civ. Szav. LAW § 105(1) (b) (McKinney 1959).
44. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967). The New York
courts had not yet interpreted the scope of the loyalty statutes, and the Court, therefore,
did not have the benefit of a judicial gloss. In view of the complicated plan and other
factual circumstances, the Court noted that this was not a proper case for abstention
pending state court interpretation. Id. at 601 n.9.
45. Id. at 604. Again, the language of Indiana's proscriptive statute, note 3 supra,
is very similar to §§ 105(1) (a) and (b) of the Civil Service Law in this case. The
same objections, therefore, could be raised in respect to Indiana's statute.
46. The Civil Service Law barred from public employment any individual who
"organizes or helps to organize or becomes a member of any.., group of persons which
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ship as used in these statutes was qualified only by scienter; citing
Elfbrandt as establishing the governing standard, the Court held that the
absence of statutory language relating to active membership and to
specific intent to further the unlawful goals violated constitutional limi-
tations." The presumption raised by the statute could be rebutted only
by "(a) a denial of membership, (b) a denial that the organization
advocates the overthrow of the government by force, or (c) a denial that
the teacher has knowledge of such advocacy."4 8 Proof of inactive
membership or of the absence of intent to further unlawful purposes
would not rebut the presumption; consequently, the impact of the statute
exceeded that which the state was justified to impose.
Keyishian. expressly holds that the Elfbrandt standard governs all
loyalty statutes. Although the New York statutes, unlike those in
Elfbrandt, did not provide for criminal punishment, the Court neverthe-
less concluded that "mere knowing membership without a specific intent
to further the unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally
adequate basis for exclusion" from public employment.4" The Court
regarded as immaterial the question of whether the loss of public
employment constitutes "punishment" because "there can be no doubt
that the repressive impact of the threat of discharge will be no less direct
or substantial."5 When an individual must guess as to what conduct will
cause him to lose his position, he will necessarily restrict his conduct to
that which is unquestionably safe and clearly within the lawful zone.
Since knowing membership by itself cannot be punished,"' it would be
quite anomalous to allow an individual to be discharged for such lawfully
protected conduct. 2 Any discharge for mere knowing membership would
teaches or advocates that the government ... shall be overthrown by force or violence,
or by any unlawful means." N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 105(1) (c) (McKinney 1959).
The Feinberg Law directed the board of regents to make a list of organizations,
after notice and hearing, which advocate the violent overthrow of the government. "The
board of regents shall provide ... that membership in any such organization included in
such listing . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification" for public
employment. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3022(2) (McKinney 1953).
47. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608 (1967).
48. Id. Indiana's proscriptive statute concerning membership in subversive organiza-
tions, note 3 supra, does not expressly define membership with the necessary qualifications
of "specific intent" and "active" membership. Thus, it appears to be unconstitutional
in its scope.
49. Id. at 606.
50. Id. at 607 n.11.
51. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) ; Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961).
52. In a case which involved the power of the state to deny tax exemptions to
persons who engaged in conduct proscribed by an oath, the Court assumed without
deciding that the state could deny tax exemptions on the basis of conduct "for which
they might be fined or imprisoned." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). The
Court did not recognize any justification to deny a right or privilege on the basis of
lawful conduct.
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not be justified by the state's interest since knowing membership by
itself does not seriously endanger the security of the state. In support of
this conclusion, the Court reasoned: "[a] law which applied to member-
ship without the 'specific intent' to further the aims of the organization
infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms. It rests on the doctrine
of 'guilt by association' which has no place here.""3
The dissent in Keyishian strongly contended that the majority
opinion was erroneous and inconsistent with the prior loyalty cases
which merely required scienter."4 The early decisions had been quoted
with approval in several cases over a period of fifteen years, and their
validity had never been questioned. The dissent asserted that "state
statutes of similar character and language have been approved by this
Court." Furthermore, the Court had considered the same statutes in
Adler v. Board of Educ. and had concluded: "[w] e find no constitutional
infirmity in [the respective section] of the Civil Service Law of New
York or in the Feinberg Law which implemented it. . . ."" Never-
theless, there are strong policy arguments for the majority's position,
and support can be gleaned from the cases themselves.
Professors and teachers in public schools have advanced the majority
of contentions in this area. Since most statutes apply to all public
employees, the professor cannot claim special treatment; this would
raise serious questions of equal protection. However, the Court has
recognized that the relation of the academic profession to the freedoms
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments "brings the safeguards
of those amendments vividly into operation.""
53. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967) ; Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966). The application of this standard to all loyalty statutes was
hardly unexpected. Language in other cases involving oaths subject to perjury supported
this result. Thus, in two cases, the Court said: "It is not the penalty itself that is
invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is so vague and inde-
finite as to be no standard at all." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961). The primary concern in
those cases was not the perjury sanctions, but the undue infringement of individual
freedom. For other language which serves to emphasize this point, see Baggett v.
Bullitt, supra at 372; and Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, supra at 287-88.
54. The dissent in Elfbrandt assumed that the majority did not intend to impose
the requirements of "specific intent" and "active" membership upon all loyalty statutes
because the majority did not mention or purport to overrule the earlier cases. Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 20-23 (1966).
55. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 623-25 (1967). The dissent cited
Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958), Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958),
and Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; but, these cases did not
involve issues of vagueness, and they also preceded the Elfbrandt decision. The dissent
also stated that the Court had approved of similar language in the Smith Act cases, but
it failed to mention the requirements which were established in those cases.
56. 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
57. Shelton v. Trucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 195 (1952).
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Education in a democratic society performs two major functions:
first, the transmission of existing knowledge and values, and second, the
development of a critical attitude toward such knowledge and values
for the purpose of facilitating orderly change.58 Substantial freedom is
required to fulfill both of these functions effectively. The first is not
restricted to the mere indoctrination of students in the values of a narrow
qr provincial majority; rather, in a pluralistic society, its proper scope
is the broader range of values in the community of civilized men in
general. The second obviously demands free inquiry and experimentation
both within and without the classroom. Education must reflect the
current and future needs of society and this necessitates direct contact by
the professor with the changing society itself. 9 Activity outside of the
classroom, including membership in organizations, serves as a useful and,
in some cases, necessary source of information and experience for the
professor. To establish knowing membership alone as the standard, or to
allow broad language to prevail, would result in a serious impairment
of the professor's ability to fulfill these functions. The Court has recogniz-
ed this fact.6"
Many professors have become apprehensive and fearful of join-
ing any political or quasi-political organization. 6 The professor's occupa-
58. Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member As Citizen, 28
LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 525, 547-48 (1963).
59. Id. at 548-49.
60. Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings
made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born
of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit
of understanding in the grouping endeavors of what are called the social
sciences, the concern of which is man and society .... For society's
good... inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimula-
tion in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as pos-
sible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of
freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the people's
well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 344 U.S. 234, 261-62 (1957).
It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-
mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible
citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public
opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by
the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of
open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task
if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are
denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry,
by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas,
into the checkered history of social and economic dogma.
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197 (1952).
61. One teacher is quoted in an interview as follows:
In the present state of affairs, I won't join any political group.
Almost any group that is trying to protect what it thinks is civil
liberties, I think could end up on the Attorney General's list. I know
for a fact that in the past contributions by check to certain organizations
were photographed, and it goes on now. I send no checks to such things.
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tion consists of the use of his thought and speech, and if he loses his
position because of his conduct, it will be difficult for him to remain in
his profession. This apprehension may be slight if the professor's particu-
lar field is far removed from the proscribed area, but this fact points to the
very reason for which most of the professors are indifferent to the
danger of the statutes. A great majority of them deal with "safe" sub-
jects and limit themselves to "safe" conduct without objection or dif-
ficulty. But in many areas, such as political science, sociology, and
philosophy, the professor is seriously restrained if he is forced to restrict
his conduct to that which is unquestionably safe." Broad loyalty statutes
which establish knowing membership as grounds for discharge are not
conducive to the promotion of the sense of freedom necessary to fulfill
the educational functions. Here, again, the Court has expressed an
awareness of the situation.63
It cannot be denied that the position of a teacher offers unique
advantages for subversive purposes; the teacher is constantly in contact
with a receptive audience not ordinarily available to the subversive. It
is the teacher who "shapes the attitudes of young minds toward the
society in which they live" 4 and, for this reason, the state does have a
vital interest in the preservation of the integrity of the schools. However,
broad loyalty statutes tend to distort the proper balance between the
functions of education by overemphasizing the indoctrination to present
values. Academic freedom does not cease to exist in the realm of ideas
Morris, Acadcmic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEIP. PROB. 487, 512
n.139 (1963). See id. at 501 n.80 for a detailed presentation of the percentages of
professors affected by oaths and the nature of their apprehension.
62. fachlup, On Some 11isconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, All. Ass'N.
OF U. PROFESSORs BULL. 753, 783 (1955).
63. The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in
a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries
cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences,
where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolute. Scholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civiliza-
tion will stagnate and die.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957).
There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person
excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In view of
the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed it has become a badge
of infamy.... Especially is this so in time of cold war and hot emotions
when 'each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy.'
Wieman v. Upegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952).
64. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
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which does not coincide with the orthodox.6" In order to allow for the
advancement of society, the professor should be encouraged to pursue
and discuss abstract theory and to advocate orderly changes. The Court
has also recognized the need for such activity.6"
Not only policy, but the cases also offer support for the majority's
position. In Keyishian, the Court explained that its decision concerning
the vagueness of the statutes did not overrule or conflict with its decision
in Adler. In effect, Adler had held that "there was no constitutional
infirmity" in the New York statutes "on their faces and that they were
capable of constitutional application."67 The issue of vagueness was not
heard or decided in that case; concerning the Education Law, the Court
had explicitly stated that it would not consider the question of vague-
ness."s The only vagueness question actually considered in Alder involved
the term "subversive" organization in the Education Law. Without
passing upon any other language in the statute, the Court held that "the
65. Machlup, supra note 62, at 777. The author provides a graphic illustration
which distinguishes between subversive activity and academic freedom:
There are important differences among (1) a teacher who organizes a
violent uprising, tells his students what actions they should take, what weapons
to wield, what buildings to occupy at an appointed time or signal; (2) a teacher
who harrangues his students, urging them to participate in a revolutionary
conspiracy; (3) a teacher who presents to his students the "need" or "desir-
ability" of a violent overthrow of the government; (4) a teacher who, in his
comparative description of alternative social, political, and economic systems,
is disparagingly critical of the present system and full of praise for a substitute
system; (5) a teacher who, in his comparative description of social, political
and economic institutions within the present system, shows a decided preference
for radical changes.
The author then comments that the line of subversive activity should be drawn either
before or after the third of these cases, depending on the circumstances of that case.
Id. at 773-74.
66. Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen
shall have the right to engage in political expression and association
... . Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally
been through the media of political association. . . . All political
ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two
major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity
by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the
vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately
accepted. Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not
to be condemned. The absence of such voices would be a symptom of
grave illness in our society.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957).
67. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 594 (1967).
68. Without raising in the complaint or in the proceedings in the lower
courts the question of the constitutionality of § 3021 of the Education
Law of New York, appellants urge here for the first time that this
section is unconstitutionally vague. The question is not before us. We
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a state statute before the
state courts have had an opportunity to do so.
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952). Appellants in Keyisidan had timely
asserted the issue of vagueness in the lower court. 255 F. Supp. 981 (W.D.N.Y. 1966).
Thus, the question in this case was properly before the Court for decision.
474
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word has a very definite meaning, namely, an organization that teaches
and advocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence.""0
And since the Court did not review any language in the Civil Service
Law, the questions of vagueness were not decided in Alder.
In respect to the Feinberg Law, Keyishian clearly extended the
holding in Adler. The Court frankly admitted that pertinent "constitu-
tional doctrine has developed since Adler;"'7° since the issue of nominal
and passive membership had not been specifically raised and decided
until Elfbrandt, Adler was not necessarily dispositive of the issue. Fur-
thermore, the opinion in Adler raises questions as to the intended extent
of its holding. Considering the general framework of the statutes, the
Court had stated:
[h]as the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech
or assembly? We think not. Such persons are or may be denied
. . . the privilege of working for the school system of the
State . . .because, first, of their advocacy of the overthrow
of the government by force or violence, or, secondly, by unex-
plained membership in an organization found by the school
authorities, after notice and hearing, to teach and advocate
the overthrow of the government by force or violence, and
known by such persons to have such purpose.'
Advocacy of overthrow by force or violence implies activity with intent,
as the Court indicates in Cramp and Baggett, as well as in the Smith
Act cases. And the fact that the Court modified the word "membership"
by "unexplained" would seem to indicate that more than mere knowing
membership was contemplated. If certain circumstances concerning know-
ing membership were satisfactorily explained, then it would be inferred
that the teacher would not be denied employment. To conclude otherwise
would in effect hold the word "unexplained" to be virtually meaningless.
Facts concerning activity and specific intent would seem to be inevitably
involved in any "explanation" of knowing membership. Although this
argument interprets the opinion much as if it were a statute, nevertheless,
it indicates that the Court did not establish knowing membership alone
as an absolute and unqualified standard.
In Keyishian, the Court stated that "constitutional doctrine which
has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major premise."72 That
premise, as it is stated in Adler, is that teachers "may work for the school
69. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
70. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967).
71. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
72. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
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system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of
New York. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at
liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.", 3 The
dissent, however, asserted that the cases have not rejected this basis."'
While it is perhaps incorrect to proclaim that the premise has been
"rejected" in the total sense of the word, it cannot be denied that the
Court has seriously qualified the thrust of that premise. In the case
which followed Adler, the Court said in respect to its statement:
[t]o draw from this language the facile generalization that there
is no constitutionally protected right to public employment is to
obscure the issue. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro-
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pur-
suant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."'
Thus, in accordance with the recent cases, the first and fourteenth
amendments demand that "guiltless knowing behavior" be excluded from
the scope of the statute and that proscribed membership be clearly defined
with specific intent and activity. The terms laid down by proper authorities
can be "reasonable" or lawful only if these requirements are satisfied. In
effect, then, the individual still must choose to work for the school
system upon the terms which the state may impose, but the breadth of
those terms has been restricted.
In Elfbrandt and Keyishian, the Court cities Aptheker v. Secretary
of State"6 to support the standards established in the recent loyalty
cases. Aptheker involved a.statute77 which provided that a member of an
organization which the Subversive Activities Control Board had ordered
to register as a communist organization could not apply for or use a
passport. The statute did not require any consideration of the member's
activity or commitment to the organization's purposes. The Court stated:
"[t] hese factors, like knowledge, would bear on the likelihood that travel
by such a person would be attended by the type of activity which Congress
73. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). The Court further stated
that the teacher's "freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employ-
ment in the school system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly,
except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice." Id. at 493.
74. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 623-25 (1967).
75. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). In another case, the Court
said: "To say that a person does not have a constitutional right to government
employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and non-
discriminatory terms laid down by proper authorities." Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956). For similar statements, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 380 (1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 284 (1961);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
76. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
77. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
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sought to control." 8 The relationship between the mere fact of member-
ship, even if it were knowing, and the interest which Congress sought to
protect was held to be too tenuous. Because the statute restricted basic
freedoms, it had to be "narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil."79
Since the first amendment applies equally to state and federal government,
Aptleker and the Smith Act cases indicate that these standards govern
all legislation which proscribes subversive conduct."0
Keyiszian. is not, therefore, erroneous or inconsistent. The earlier
cases dealt only with the issue of knowing and innocent membership,
but recently the Court has been faced with the task of questioning what
conduct is actually embraced by the statutes. In reaching its decisions,
the Court has imposed strict standards in view of the fact that first
amendment freedoms are involved.
Whitehill v. Elkins8' illustrates the intense attitude of the Court
in this area of fundamental rights. The Maryland Ober Act contained an
oath subject to perjury which simply provided: "I ... certify that I am
not engaged in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the
Government . . . by force or violence."82 The attorney general and the
University of Maryland Board of Regents prescribed the oath under the
authority of section 11 of the Act which directed every state agency to
establish procedures designed to ascertain that each applicant "is not a
subversive person." Section 1 of the Ober Act defined a "subversive" in
language very similar to that which was considered in Baggett.83 Since
sections 1, 11, and 13 were so interrelated, the Court concluded, that the
oath was an integral part of the Act to be read in connection with the
statutory definition of a "subversive." '84
78. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510 (1964).
79. Id. at 514.
80. See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), where the
Court held that mere knowing membership could not support a finding of moral
unfitness justifying disbarment.
81. 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
82. MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 13 (1957). Originally, the oath also required the
applicant to certify that he was "not knowingly a member of an organization engaged"
in an attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence. However, the Attorney
General deleted this certification after the decision in Elf irandt.
83. The statute defined a "subversive" as "any person who commits ... or advo-
cates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit . . . any act
intended to overthrow, destory or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or
alteration of, the . . . government . . . by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a
member of a subversive organization . . . ." MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 1 (1957)
(emphasis added). The latter term was defined as a group that would, inter alia, "alter"
the government "by revolution, force, or violence."
84. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 56-57 (1967). MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, §
18 (1957) contained a severability clause which provided: "[i]f any provision . . . of
this article . . . is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions . . .
which can be given effect without the invalid provision. . . " The District Court held
that this was a clear case of severability. Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589, 596
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Before the Court could review the definitions, it was necessary to
determine the effect of Gerende v. Board of Supervisors."' That case
involved an oath contained in section 15 of the Ober Act which was
required of all candidates for public office. It was argued in Gerende that
the oath incorporated section 1 of the Ober Act and that the definitions
in section 1 were unconstitutionally vague. But the Court indicated in
Whitehill, as it had previously indicated,86 that it had rejected this
interpretation and did not pass upon or approve section 1 in Gerende."7
There, the state court had interpreted the words "revolution, force, or
violence" to include only revolution by force or violence ;" consequently,
"alteration" was also to be restricted to alteration by force or violence.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held:
[w]e read this decision to hold that to obtain a place on a Mary-
land ballot a candidate need only make oath that he is not a
person who is engaged "in one way or another in the attempt
to overthrow the government by force or violence," and that he
is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in
such an attempt. [Citing the state court.] 9
The Court had based its judgment on the fact that the attorney general
during oral argument offered "to accept an affidavit in these terms as
satisfying in full the statutory requirement.""0 Thus, the Court avoided
the constitutional issue that was argued in Gerende. But, since the Court
in Whitehill concluded that the oath was to be read in connection with
the definitions in section 1, it stated "we are faced with the kind of
problem which we thought we had avoided in Gerende."''
Another relevant Maryland case92 involved a hearing at which an
(D. Md. 1966). However, the Supreme Court refused to separate sections 1 and 13.
The Court also pointed out that the statute was enacted pursuant to art. 15, § 11
of the Maryland Constitution which provides: "No person who is a member of an
organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government . . . through force or
violence shall be eligible" for public employment. Since there was no severability
clause applicable to this provision, the Court doubted that § 18 could restrict the
membership clause in § 1 more narrowly than the constitutional provision. Whitehill
v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 61 n.2 (1967).
85. 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
86. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 368 n.7 (1964). It was argued in Baggett
that the Court had found no constitutional infirmity in section 1 of the Ober Act which
contained language nearly identical to that presented in Baggett. It was therefore
necessary to consider the effect of Gerende in that case also.
87. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 58 (1967).
88. Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 190-91, 76 A.2d 332, 337-38 (1950).
89. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 346 U.S. 56, 56-57 (1951). Of course, the
language relating to membership has been qualified by Elfbran dt.
90. Id.
91. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59 (1967).
92. Character Comm. v. Mandras, 233 Md. 285, 192 A.2d 782 (1963).
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applicant for admission to the Maryland bar testified that he had joined
the communist party at one time because of his interest in civil liberties
and in the candidacy of Henry Wallace. Since he established that he had
not advocated the overthrow of the government by force or violence, he
was not found to be a subversive. Thus, it could be argued that as a
matter of state law an individual would not be considered a subversive c.
the basis of passive membership. Notwithstanding this case and the
earlier case' which interpreted the word "revolution" to mean only
"revolution by force or violence," the Court still stated "as we read §§ 1
and 13 of the Ober Act, the alteration clause and membership clause are
still befogged." '94 Directing its attention to the definitions in section
1, the Court concluded:
[t]he lines between permissible and impermissible conduct are
quite indistinct. Precision and clarity are not present. Rather
we find an overbreadth that makes possible oppressive or
capricious application as regimes change....
... [w] e have another classic example of the need for "narrowly
drawn" legislation . . . in this sensitive and important First
Amendment area. 5
Thus, a loyalty statute-whether an oath or a proscriptive statute-
must contain "terms susceptible of objective measurement" and cannot in-
clude "guiltless knowing behavior." And, in respect to membership in or-
ganizations, the state must expressly proscribe not only knowing but also
"active" membership with "specific intent" to further an illegal purpose.
Although these strict requirements will undoubtedly necessitate appro-
priate changes in most, if not all, state loyalty programs, they nevertheless
establish a proper balance between the state's legitimate interest and
the individual's rights.
REFUSAL TO ANSWER
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works96 established that a state may
properly inquire into political conduct in order to determine its employees'
fitness for public service and that refusal to answer is sufficient cause for
discharge. In allowing the state's interest to prevail, however, the Court
has developed a rather fine distinction between "loyalty" and "fitness."
The state cannot summarily discharge on the ground of disloyalty an
employee who invokes the fifth amendment. In Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., the Court stated that consideration must be given "to
93. Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950).
94. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 61 (1967).
95. Id. at 61-62.
96. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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such factors as the subject matter of the questions, remoteness of the
period to which they are directed, or justification for exercise of the
privilege.""T Slochower had refused to answer a question posed by a con-
gressional committee whose inquiry was explicitly proclaimed not to
concern "the property, affairs, or government of the city, or ... official
conduct of city employees.""5 Since the questioning did not directly
relate to any state interest embodied in a statute, there was no ground
other than disloyalty to conclude that he had disqualified himself by
invoking the fifth amendment, and his dismissal was therefore held
unconstitutional. The Court distinguished Garner by pointing out that
the question of the affidavit in that case attempted to elicit information
necessary to determine fitness for state employment. This distinction
has been confirmed in two cases where discharges for refusal to answer
were based on statutory grounds of "reliability"9  and "incom-
petency" ;.0 it has even been extended to a discharge based on statutory
ground of "insubordination" where the employee refused to answer a
question asked by a congressional committee.' Thus, use of the fifth
amendment cannot raise an inference of disloyalty; due process requires
the state to prove disloyalty in an adequate hearing. But, a dismissal
based on a refusal to answer a question relating to an established state
interest other than disloyalty, such as "incompetency" or "insubordina-
tion," does not violate due process; the state has power to establish
qualifications for public employment and dismissal for failure to satisfy
the qualification is not considered as punishment." 2
97. 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956).
98. Id.
99. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958). The employee invoked the fifth amend-
ment when asked whether he was a member of the Communist Party; the Court held
that his "lack of frankness and candor" evidenced by his refusal to answer created
substantial doubt as to his "reliability" and that his doubt was independent of any
reason which the employee may have had for his silence.
100. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). The employee invoked
the fifth amendment when asked whether he was a member of the Communist Political
Association; the Court held that the dismissal was based upon a refusal to answer
questions pertaining to relevant activities rather than upon the activities themselves
and that this "lack of frankness and candor" was sufficient to support a charge of
"incompetency" and "insubordination" as opposed to a charge of disloyalty.
101. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960). The employee invoked
the fifth amendment when asked whether he was a member of the Communist Party;
the Court held that the dismissal was not based upon any inference of guilt but rather
upon a charge of "insubordination" as evidenced by the employee's failure to give
information in which the state had a legitimate interest.
102. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951). The contention
that an oath is an ex post facto law or bill of attainder is dismissed by the same
reasoning. However, the Garner case involved an oath resulting in discharge. It would
seem that this would be a proper defense to an oath subject to perjury if the employee
were prosecuted in appropriate circumstances. The Court has not yet made such a
distinction.
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This distinction may seem to be without substance in that it appears
to allow the state to accomplish indirectly that which it cannot do directly.
Thus, the state can dismiss an employee without proving disloyalty if the
employee refuses to answer a question relating to his loyalty and if the
dismissal is expressly based on some ground other than disloyalty. How-
ever, if the employee is dismissed for refusing to answer the question, he
cannot prove any substantial injury. By refusing to answer, the employee
deprives the state of information which is relevant to his qualifications,
and he also creates a substantial doubt as to his reliabilty and coopera-
tiveness. It is well established that there is no absolute constitutional
right to public employment and that the state may impose reasonable
requirements for qualification."0 3 If the question substantially relates to
the employee's fitness, he cannot complain of a dismissal which is
specifically based on his refusal to answer that question. If the employee
does answer the question, he is adequately protected because the state
must then provide a hearing to determine his disloyalty in order to support
a dismissal. This distinction is therefore necessary to establish a reason-
able and effective method of investigation for the state.
Although the public employee thus has no absolute right of silence,
the state must still prove sufficient relevancy of the questioning to
fitness. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 4 the employee refused to
answer certain questions concerning the Progressive Party. The Court
held his dismissal unconstitutional on the ground that the conduct pro-
scribed by the statute was only a remote threat to the security of the
state; the scope of the statute went "well beyond those who were engaged
in efforts designed to alter the form of government by force or
violence."10 5
The state must also be able to show that it has reasonable or
reliable information which justified the questioning.' This does not
mean, however, that the state's power of investigation is severely restrict-
ed; to the contrary, the Court has allowed wide latitude for investigatory
legislation designed to protect the state. In defining the limits of the
state's power, the Court has only objected to an "attempt to pillory
witnesses," "indiscriminate dragnet procedures, lacking in probable cause
for a belief that [the employee] possessed information which might be
helpful," and irrelevancy of the questions.' Exercise of the investiga-
tory power does not require evidence sufficient to justify the institution
103. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
104. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
105. Id. at 246.
106. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1958).
107. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133 (1959).
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of criminal proceedings for subversion.' In order to conduct inquiries
effectively, the legislature must have reasonable leeway.
THE CONSCIENTIOUS
Although the state's power to prescribe loyalty oaths has been
severely restricted in many important areas, the problem posed by the
conscientious still remains unanswered. The Court has recognized that
the individual is protected against exclusion from public employment on
grounds which are patently arbitrary or discriminatory.0 9 But, it is not
yet clear whether this protection extends to require a hearing for
an individual who has refused to take the oath so that he may prove
his loyalty and thereby qualify for employment.
The question was brought to the Court in Nostrand v. Little.""
There, the employees claimed that an oath statute violated due process
because it did not provide for a hearing at which an individual could
explain or defend his refusal to subscribe to the oath. The Court remanded
the case to the state court since, inter alia, the state court had not con-
sidered the issue in this case; the opinion implied that if a hearing were
not allowed, due process would be violated."' On remand, the state
court held that only if the employee had established tenure rights would
he be entitled to a hearing under his contact of employment."' The
complainants appealed to the Supreme Court without asking for a hearing
in accordance with the state decision, and the case was dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question."'
The issue of the rights of a non-tenured employee under the same
statute was raised shortly thereafter in a federal case." 4 Recognizing
the effect on public opinion of a discharge for refusal to take an oath on
grounds which are unrelated to disloyalty, the district court stated that the
protection of due process was involved in these circumstances with
compelling force. However, in view of the fact that the state urged the
court not to assume that non-tenured employees would not be entitled to
a hearing, the court presumed that the statute would be constitutionally
108. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
109. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
110. 362 U.S. 474 (1960).
111. The Court noted that the state had previously required a hearing in a similar
case, and, in view of this fact, it thought that the state should have had an opportunity
to decide the issue. Id. at 475.
112. Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wash. 2d 655, 344 P.2d 216 (1959).
113. Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
114. Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
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applied."' Thus, Nostrand and the district court opinion imply that a
hearing would be required.16
However, it might be contended that there is no constitutional
necessity for a hearing. In accordance with the distinction established
in the refusal-to-answer cases, refusal to comply with a requirement
imposed by the state could be grounds for exclusion because of insub-
ordination or lack of cooperation."' But such grounds would need to be
explicitly designated because an inference of disloyalty cannot be raised
from a mere refusal to comply." 8 If such grounds were designated, it
could be argued that no conclusive presumption of disloyalty has resulted
and that the individual is unfit for public service because he has failed
to fulfill the state-imposed requirements for his employment.
This argument, however, demands careful consideration. While most
people will take a loyalty oath with a feeling of pride and without
objection, there is a significant number of qualified people of unquestioned
loyalty who refuse to do so because of some conscientious reason. 19
The only justification for the oath is the protection of the government
by the exclusion of the disloyal from public employment. If there is no
opportunity for a hearing to explain or defend the refusal, then the oath
would eliminate the conscientious as well as the disloyal. 2 Obviously,
such high principles pose no threat to the security of the state; in fact,
those who adhere to them are usually model citizens. A statute which
allows subversives, trained to commit perjury, to take the oath and
thereby qualify, and which at the same time disqualifies those who
refuse to take the oath for reasons other than disloyalty, does not
accomplish any legitimate objective. The injury to the conscientious
cannot be justified by any state interest.
It has been argued that there is a significant distinction between
discharge for refusal to answer a question and discharge for refusal to
115. Id. at 452. The Supreme Court later declared this statute unconstitutional
on grounds of vagueness, but it did not consider the hearing issue. Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
116. Although this conclusion is based largely on inferences, it is certainly
doubtful that the Court would distinguish between tenured and non-tenured employees,
or between employees who already have a contract and those who are seeking employ-
ment, since such distinctions for the purpose of establishing loyalty would raise serious
problems of equal protection.
117. See Comment, Loyalty Oaths, Conscience, and the Constitution, 5 ARiz.
L. Rzv. 254, 259-60 (1963).
118. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
119. See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
480 (1953) ; Horowitz, Report on the Los Angeles City and County Loyalty Programs,
5 STAN. L. REv. 233 (1953) ; Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963).
120. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 15, 381 P.2d 554, 561 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
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take an oath.' In the former, the employee refuses to answer any
questions which are relevant to his qualifications, and the ground for his
refusal bears a direct relation to disloyalty or lack of cooperation. In the
latter, however, the individual refuses to do an act which he finds
repugnant; generally, he is willing to answer questions relating to
fitness, 2 but he will not subscribe to an oath. Under these circumstances,
the ground for his refusal does not stem from disloyalty or lack of
cooperation, but rather it relates to conscience. If a hearing were provided,
then the individual could explain his refusal. The burden of proof
should, however, rest upon the individual since the state concededly has
the power to require subscription to an oath.123 The state could then
determine whether the individual's refusal related to disloyalty, lack of
cooperation, or merely to conscience. If the individual adequately proves
his loyalty and cooperativeness, he should be able to obtain employ-
ment.2 4 By providing such a hearing, the ideal standard excluding only
the disloyal and the insubordinate would be achieved. Since the state
could thus establish that a discharge or exclusion from public employ-
ment was not arbitrary or discriminatory, the requirements of due
process would be satisfied.
CONCLUSION: OATHS VS. PROSCRIPTIVE STATUTES
While the oath represents one method by which the state can
require an affirmation of loyalty as a qualification for employment, there
is no compelling argument which establishes it as the best means
available for the state's objective of securing loyalty. Two arguments
are frequently advanced in support of the oath. 22 First, in connection
with oaths subject to perjury, it is argued that the oath operates to
convict subversives. This argument is based on a misconception of the
purpose of perjury statutes. It is not their function to stamp out the
121. Id. at 16-17, 381 P.2d at 564-65.
122. See Byse, supra note 119, at 482 n.5, for illustrative statements of such
individuals.
123. See Comment, Loyalty Oaths, Conscience, and the Constitutioi, 5 ARiz. L.
REv. 254, 264 (1963).
124: The contention that this would impose an unreasonable burden on the state
by resulting in a multiplicity of hearings is unjustified. Most people subscribe to an oath
without objection. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 14, 381 P.2d 554, 563 (1963) (con-
curring opinion).
125. Byse, supra note 119, at 484-87. The author also surmises three reasons for
which legislatures have enacted broad loyalty oaths. First, the problem of subversion and
the available means for its control have been erroneously estimated. Second, emotion
rather than reason motivates the legislature to enact another law to demonstrate a
hatred of communism. And finally, in view of the fact that the legislators are elected
by popular ballot, they are very reluctant to vote against any loyalty statute; such action
can be, and has been as the author illustrates 'by example, misrepresented by one's
political opponent. And, it can be, as it has been in fact, the cause of popular reaction
against the individual and his family. Id. at 507.
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Communist Party and its affiliates; that purpose lies in statutes such as
the Smith Act. The true purpose of perjury statutes is to force individuals
to submit to public officials information required for the fulfillment of
state functions. A person who intentionally lies should be punished to
protect the investigatory process. Thus, the prejury sanction is a means
to an end, not an end in itself. Secondly, it is argued that the oath
provides an investigatory method of identifying subversives for the
purpose of excluding them from public employment. But, few, if any,
subversives have been revealed by an oath requirement; they do not
hesitate to subscribe to the oath.12 This argument also fails to consider
the problem of the conscientious and the atmosphere of fear and appre-
hension caused by subscription to an oath.
Loyalty oaths are neither necessary nor desirable in view of their
consequences. The state can achieve virtually the same objective by
enacting a proscriptive statute forbidding all activities which may be
required to be renounced by an oath. The state would merely need to
inform the employee of the statute and its consequences, and it could ask
the employee to answer the relevant questions in an application form;
there is no compelling reason to require the employee to swear to the
provisions. The state can protect the efficiency of its investigatory process
by enacting a refusal-to-answer statute requiring an employee to answer
questions relevant to his fitness. Loyalty would thus remain a require-
ment for qualification. But since the provisions would probably be
equivalent to the prescriptions contained in an oath, it is admitted that
similar apprehension and fear would still exist. However, it would not
exist to the same extent. Those who are serious-minded about taking
oaths would restrict their conduct much more if an oath were required 2 "
and when an oath subject to perjury is involved, needless to say, the appre-
hension and fear would be even further augmented. The use of pro-
scriptive statutes would also avoid the problems posed by the conscien-
tious.
It does not seem likely that the Court will declare an oath uncon-
stitutional as a means for achieving security. The Court does not concern
itself with the wisdom of legislative enactments. However, considering
the nature of the possible alternatives, the use of proscriptive and
refusal-to-answer statutes constitutes the wisest policy.
Anthony W. Mommer
126. See also Horowitz, supra note 119; Morris, Washington's Loyalty Oath and
"Guiltless Knowing Behavior," 39 WAsH. L. REv. 734 (1964).
127. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371-72 (1964).
